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Evangelicalism, Penal Theory, and the Politics of Criminal Law Reform in
England, 1808–1830. By Richard R. Follett. Studies in Modern History. Edited
by J. C. D. Clark.
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xi231. $65.00.
On January 25, 1819, a decade after Sir Samuel Romilly had initiated what would
prove to be the decisive parliamentary attack on England’s infamous “bloody code,”
the city of London presented a petition for reform to the House of Commons. In plead-
ing for a decisive reduction of the country’s two-hundred-plus capital crimes, the pe-
tition invoked an argument that had by then become familiar to contemporaries and
that has since become well known to historians of criminal justice: that the undue
severity of a system that prescribed capital punishment for theft was self-defeating.
The obvious disproportion between the severity of the crime on the one hand and that
of its punishment on the other was more likely to discourage victims from prosecuting
than it was to ensure the regular display of a hanging whose deterrent purpose was the
sole acceptable basis for capital punishment in the first place. This particular petition,
however, insisted that a greater challenge now faced the prevailing system than simply
that posed by the random sentiment of individual prosecutors generating inconsistent
enforcement. It also maintained, as Richard Follett notes in this important new book,
that the reluctance to risk putting a thief on the gallows was the consequence of in-
creasingly widely shared sentiments among the English people at large, that it stemmed
from “certain general principles of our nature, . . . the diffusion of Christianity, by
which we are daily taught to . . . ‘desire not the death of a sinner, but rather that he
should turn from his wickedness and live’” (p. 151). The constancy with which this
latter phrase was deployed in periodical and pamphlet literature during the early nine-
teenth century—and its prevalence is one of the many interesting points raised in
Follett’s study—reminds us that the emergence of evangelical belief and sentiment
was a powerful strand in the nexus of social and cultural changes that underpinned the
relatively swift and almost total abandonment of England’s sweeping capital code be-
tween 1808 and 1837.
This insight will not come as any great surprise to readers familiar with the work of
Randall McGowen, or even with V. A. C. Gatrell’s sweeping (if underdeveloped) attack
upon such a proposition in his acclaimed tour de force, The Hanging Tree (Oxford,
1994). Indeed, the sheer familiarity of the theme is such that the real surprise must be
that this new study is in fact the first to pursue it in book-length detail. For this reason,
certainly, we must be grateful to Follett. He has produced a comprehensive and emi-
nently readable account of a complex subject, one that is based on a good grasp of
parliamentary debates and contemporary periodicals and especially of modern schol-
arship on the evangelical movement. If I think that his book raises more questions than
it answers, in part this is a reflection of both how important its subject is and how
engaging I found it to be.
Yet the book has some major limitations. Foremost among these is that the largest
part of its narrative is devoted to a recitation of both the chronology and the major
arguments by parliamentary critics of the capital code that will be familiar to all readers
of the first volume of Leon Radzinowicz’s monumental History of English Criminal
Law (London, 1948–86). Like Radzinowicz, Follett attributes heroic leadership status
to Romilly (to whom no less than three of Follett’s nine chapters are largely given
over), as well as to his successor James Mackintosh. This need not be a problem in
itself. Romilly especially, perhaps, was a hero. He was not in any obvious way, how-
ever—as Follett’s account of him somewhat indirectly and uncomfortably recog-
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nizes—an evangelical (pp. 48–51). More importantly, his arguments against the capital
code, like those of the other leading figures of the movement within parliament, were
almost invariably couched in pragmatic and practical terms rather than drawing on the
moral and religious ethos to which Follett wants to give pride of place. True, Romilly
and Mackintosh alike were concerned to ensure the support of such preeminent evan-
gelical members of Parliament (MPs) as William Wilberforce and (from 1818) Thomas
Fowell Buxton. But I for one wanted to see a more sustained and substantive demon-
stration of the first of Follett’s two key assertions, namely, that “Evangelical MPs cast
the key votes that committed the House of Commons to criminal law reforms over
Government objections” (p. 3). For that matter, one wants to know more about some-
thing that Follett’s account reveals but passes over in silence: the number of occasions
on which divisions over bills to rescind portions of the capital code incidentally reveal
the absence from the Commons of as much as 80 percent of its membership, a curious
state of affairs for so vitally important an issue as the criminal law must presumably
have been.
More critically, and again as Follett’s own account makes clear, the real problem in
repealing the capital code lay not so much in the Commons as in the intransigent
opposition of the House of Lords, following the lead of men such as Lords Eldon and
Ellenborough and other judges of the realm. What critical weight, if any, did evangelical
belief play in turning the tide of opinion among the judges and the peers? In this
connection, Follett’s second major assertion, that the “activism” and publicizing of
evangelicals “helped bring others around to the reformers’ view” and “shaped the
options for reform” (p. 3) might fill the gap. Yet it seemed to me that this element of
his account—evangelical opinion as expressed in Britain’s burgeoning and increasingly
influential periodical press (pp. 67–89, 133–45)—is not developed in nearly as much
detail as it could have been. This being the case, it would perhaps be superfluous to
add that, although this book recognizes a clear need to reply to Gatrell’s vehement
denial of a significant role for evangelical belief in the underlying causes of the abolition
of the capital code, its case is not made in nearly enough detail or precision to satisfy
either those who were impressed by Gatrell’s version or those who were irritated by
it.
Here then we have a useful, even important, but ultimately not a definitive study of
a vital theme in the emergence of modern criminal law and of public attitudes toward
it. It is astonishing that, less than ten pages from the end of his book, Follett observes
that by 1830, as they neared the home stretch in their quarter-century of struggle against
the capital code and its precepts, “ardent reformers had learned from experience. . . .
that those who were unpersuaded by appeals to Christianity and human feeling would
listen more to worldly reasoning, such as the appeal for the better protection of property
and social order” (p. 180). It is not clear to me that this was a recent insight in 1830—
and if it was not, where does that leave Follett’s central theses?
SIMON DEVEREAUX
University of Queensland
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Tue, 10 Nov 2015 17:36:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
